Daniel Dennett on William Lane Craig and God

Here's my first video presentation.

The video of Dennett's presentation is linked below.  This is the presentation I'm discussing in my video, which is embedded below the link,  followed by a Transcript of Dennet's presentation  A transcript of the following video is included at the bottom.  I welcome any comments.

Link to Daniel Dennet's presentation on YouTube.

Transcript of Dennet's presentation:

What professor Craig does brilliantly and with a wonderful enthusiasm, is he takes our every day intuitions, our gut feelings of what's plausible, what's counter-intuitive, what couldn't possibly be true and he cantilevers them out into territory where they've never been tested in cosmology where whatever the truth is it's mind-boggling. So we know; we know in advance that whatever the truth is, it's going to be jaw-droppingly implausible and counterintuitive in one way or another. The simplest expression of this I think was due to the late Philip Morrison who pointed out 'perhaps we are alone in the universe. Perhaps there's no other planet in the whole universe that has intelligent life on it. Or perhaps that's not true.' Both alternatives are mind-boggling. The hypothesis that we're alone is mind-boggling; the hypothesis that we're not alone is mind-boggling, so you can't use mind-bogglingness as your litmus test. The truth is going to be very hard to believe; and some of our home truths are going to have to be abandoned. We already know this from quantum physics. We already know this from Einstein. How do we get the leverage to find the epistemic sort of leverage to dislodge something that just seems so crashingly obvious, we're prepared to use it as a premise? It takes a huge scientific structure with complex mathematical arguments and a sort of delicious conspiracy of confirmatory evidence, and finally people shake their heads and say “OK, however counterintuitive this is we're going to have to accept it.” That's the situation in quantum mechanics as Richard Feynman, the late great physicist said. And he was, he was as arrogant a scientist as there ever was. He had a black belt in overconfidence. And he says “I don't understand quantum mechanics, nobody understands quantum mechanics.” Ah, maybe nobody can. In those circumstances you come to trust the mathematical theory that you can't interpret yet. Raging battles over how to interpret quantum mechanics: unsettled. But, as Feynman points out, the mathematical structure, which is just in some sense a black box that we can't yet get to the bottom of; it predicts results of such breathtaking accuracy. This comparison, I won't get it exactly right, but I think it, it's like being able to measure the distance between San Francisco and Miami to a hair's breadth. Breathtakingly accurate predictions; those are the sorts of just the weight of evidence that can overturn everyday intuitions that you think “that couldn't possibly be false.” Ah, but it turns out to be false. And what Professor Craig has shown us is how the arguments go and how, if you start with a bunch of initially very plausible premises, and in each case he says “look, this is a very plausible premise, I don't see how this could be false. This, boy this just stands to reason.” And then you pursue it and pursue it, and he does that, as near as I can see I have no quarrels with the relentless development he puts on those premises, but we end up at really remarkably implausible conclusions. Now officially of course, if you end up with a contradictory, as self-contradictory conclusion, you've got a reductio ad absurdum argument and something has to give. I cannot pin a formal reductio on anything; at least if I can, I can't do it impromptu. With an awful lot going on in that talk. But I can point to some areas of suspicion. Um, first I want to address one of the points that came up late. Maybe I'll just make that point and then, and then that will be enough.

Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the cosmological argument, one of the cosmological arguments that he presents does favor the conclusion that the cause of the universe is a timeless, changeless, abstract, immaterial whatever. At that point we have no idea what that might be. But whatever it is, it's the cause of the universe. Maybe it's the idea of an apple. Maybe it's the square route of seven. “But no,” he says, “It's nothing like that, because abstract things can't cause things.” Who says? Who says abstract things can't cause things? My favorite example of an abstract thing causing things is the principle of triangulation so that when you, when you wanna keep your house from going like this (physical demonstration), you put a triangular piece on and you tack it down and then thanks to the rigidity of triangles you create a rigid structure. It seems causal. It's quite wonderful the effect of tacking that extra piece on and making the triangle, and now we've got a rigid figure. It's, you put in geometry, an abstract principle being invoked in a causal way. But you say, “well that's not really causation.” OK, it's something like causation. And of course we've already heard from professor Craig, it's not really like causation when God causes the universe, because it's not it's not causation of; it's not physical causation. Well what do we know about non-physical causation? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. So we're really just guessing at what non-physical causation could be. Our intuitions just don't carry us into that area. Now contemporary cosmology is a fascinating area and I must say it, it completely twists my head up, and I have no confidence about anything in that area. I'm delighted that Professor Craig mentioned my colleague Alex Vilenkin, who is one smart dude, and I wish I could, I wish I could get to the bottom of all of this stuff thatAlex does. Ah, I wish Alex were here to respond. Because I know that Alex and Alan Guth and some of these other people would have an awful lot to say. Unfortunately it would be highly technical, and I don't think that I would understand it, and I don't think most of you would understand it, but it, but they first of all, they wouldn't agree. Contemporary cosmology is in a wonderful snarl. And we're gonna; those of us who are not mathematicians and physicists are going to have to sit on the sidelines and wait for something to percolate out of this. But the intrepidness with which Professor Craig leaps in there and chooses sides is a wonderful thing; I just don't have his courage on that point.

But back to the question of this changeless God. The trouble with a changeless God is that IT is changeless. It is outside of time. Don't bother praying to it or certainly don't expect IT in time to hear your prayer and answer your prayer. A changeless God is a Deist God at best. So that's why I don't think that most people in the world who believe in God need take anything more than the most passing curiosity or interest in the battle of cosmology. Because it doesn't really reflect a response to their curiosity at all. Now Professor Craig says that this, he's got some arguments that this is a personal God. Ah, one of the premises is “There's two kinds of causation: scientific causation and personal causation.” I submit that that's just false. That, that's just as good as my life work, to show how personal causation is, is reduces to scientific causation. So that's where I would drive the wedge in there. But that's a long story. Thanks very much.

Transcript of my video:

Hi.

I'm Brandon, coming to you from my apartment in San Bernardino, California.

I want to open up our blog with a look at some very basic assumptions regarding theism coming from some very well known materialists and atheists, and just on watching YouTube I stumbled upon one particular example.

I've linked a video below from YouTube on an audience presentation by Philosopher Daniel Dennett regarding Dr. William Lane Craig's Cosmological Argument for the existence of God. It is Craig's primary Kalam Cosmological Argument from which this blog is named.

In the video Dr. Dennet states regarding quantum mechanics that perhaps nobody understands it, and he places himself in that particular crowd of those who don't understand it. Dennett explains:

"This comparison, I won't get it exactly right, but I think it, it's like being able to measure the distance between San Francisco and Miami to a hair's breadth. Breathtakingly accurate predictions; those are the sorts of just the weight of evidence that can overturn everyday intuitions that you think “that couldn't possibly be false.” Ah, but it turns out to be false. And what Professor Craig has shown us is how the arguments go and how, if you start with a bunch of initially very plausible premises, and in each case he says “look, this is a very plausible premise, I don't see how this could be false. This, boy this just stands to reason.” And then you pursue it and pursue it, and he does that, as near as I can see I have no quarrels with the relentless development he puts on those premises, but we end up at really remarkably implausible conclusions. Now officially of course, if you end up with a contradictory, as self-contradictory conclusion, you've got a reductio ad absurdum argument and something has to give. I cannot pin a formal reductio on anything; at least if I can, I can't do it impromptu. With an awful lot going on in that talk. But I can point to some areas of suspicion."

So Dennett is saying that because quantum mechanics, and related cosmology are so accurate, yet counterintuitive to our basic assumptions about reality, that unless we understand them, we cannot really make the kinds of truth claims that Craig makes regarding the existence of God; that it's so complicated, that we cannot know for certain.

Well I'm not at all concerned with certainty and accurate scientific plausibility. What I'm concerned with is the basis for knowing upon which even quantum mechanics and all of science is based. They are all philosophically based, and Dennett as a first rate philosopher should understand that.

He continues:

"Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the cosmological argument, one of the cosmological arguments that he presents does favor the conclusion that the cause of the universe is a timeless, changeless, abstract, immaterial whatever. At that point we have no idea what that might be. But whatever it is, it's the cause of the universe. Maybe it's the idea of an apple. Maybe it's the square route of seven. “But no,” he says, “It's nothing like that, because abstract things can't cause things.” Who says? Who says abstract things can't cause things? My favorite example of an abstract thing causing things is the principle of triangulation so that when you, when you wanna keep your house from going like this (physical demonstration), you put a triangular piece on and you tack it down and then thanks to the rigidity of triangles you create a rigid structure. It seems causal. It's quite wonderful the effect of tacking that extra piece on and making the triangle, and now we've got a rigid figure. It's, you put in geometry, an abstract principle being invoked in a causal way. But you say, “well that's not really causation.” OK, it's something like causation. And of course we've already heard from professor Craig, it's not really like causation when God causes the universe, because it's not it's not causation of; it's not physical causation. Well what do we know about non-physical causation? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. So we're really just guessing at what non-physical causation could be."

Well yes, from a scientific perspective we would be guessing; but Craig is not offering a scientific perspective here, but a philosophical one that begins with the principles of right reason. And it is upon these principles that science must adhere. So he's not going off the deep end no matter what quantum physics or cosmology has to say about the matter. In fact, Craig's arguments often appeal to what we know in cosmology for the strongest arguments for God's existence. Big Bang cosmology, for example, has immediate implications for the Kalam cosmological argument – that there was a beginning event to the entire universe. I first cause to all that exists. This is one of the primary arguments of the Kalam.

But Dennett seems to believe that other cosmologists would disagree with Craig. Yes, they might disagree with Craig regarding the existence of God, but I doubt they would disagree with his own appeal to the big bang, not in forming his argument, but in evidentially supporting his argument.

Dennett continues:

"Because I know that Alex (Vilenkin) and Alan Guth and some of these other people would have an awful lot to say. Unfortunately it would be highly technical, and I don't think that I would understand it, and I don't think most of you would understand it, but it, but they first of all, they wouldn't agree. Contemporary cosmology is in a wonderful snarl. And we're gonna; those of us who are not mathematicians and physicists are going to have to sit on the sidelines and wait for something to percolate out of this. But the intrepidness with which Professor Craig leaps in there and chooses sides is a wonderful thing; I just don't have his courage on that point."

So that's it. We cannot know anything about any proposed deity until we understand cosmology, and we don't understand cosmology as much as the cosmologists do, so we could have nothing reasonable to say about God.

I think I can pick that argument apart just by what Dennett says about God in his very next words in the video.

"But back to the question of this changeless God. The trouble with a changeless God is that IT is changeless. It is outside of time. Don't bother praying to it or certainly don't expect IT in time to hear your prayer and answer your prayer. A changeless God is a Deist God at best. So that's why I don't think that most people in the world who believe in God need take anything more than the most passing curiosity or interest in the battle of cosmology. Because it doesn't really reflect a response to their curiosity at all. Now Professor Craig says that this, he's got some arguments that this is a personal God. Ah, one of the premises is “There's two kinds of causation: scientific causation and personal causation.” I submit that that's just false. That, that's just as good as my life work, to show how personal causation is, is reduces to scientific causation. So that's where I would drive the wedge in there."

Let's begin with the idea of a changeless God. I think we need to define our terms here. What do we mean by a changeless God. Is it a God in stasis who can't act in nature? Our very existence would prove otherwise. If such a God exists, and is the agent of causation for all that exists; it would appear contradictory to believe that He or “It” as Dennett prefers, would be in some sort of stasis; incapable of initiating change because IT does not change. I find this to be a glaring misrepresentation of the God that theists believe in. But Dennett asserts that a changeless god would be quote a deist god at best.

That is a bald assertion without reference to any logical premise whatsoever.

So I want you all to first understand that those who argue against theism do not always have their soldiers lined up in neat little rows where we can see the logical premises of their arguments. From that observation, I should like to continue the discussion with just what are the logical premises upon which theism stands. Stay tuned for more.

More thoughts:

This first came to me from a discussion on Uncommon Descent regarding Richard Dawkins' refusal to debate William Lane Craig one-on-one in his home town in England.  Craig just finished a speaking tour of England.  Dawkins recently stated in a published opinion piece on his reasons for not debating Craig.  A future post will discuss his reasons.

I wanted to discuss the reasons why a non-theist might be hesitant to debate Craig.  Obviously as evidenced by the linked video, Dr. Dennett has in fact debated Craig.  However, I sense that he hasn't completely engaged the argument, and resorts to some sort of argument as to why not, regarding Craig's limited understanding of Cosmology as the premise upon which his argument is formed.  As I understand him, Dennett views Craig as an over-zellous and naive debater.  I wanted to show first of all that Craig's arguments don't depend on cosmology, but on the principles of right reason, upon which even cosmology depends.   So Dennett is simply wrong regarding first of all, the conclusions that Craig is able to reach.  I think he sort of admits this, as he points out that he's unable to "pin a reductio" on Craig.

I hope to include more discussion on reductio ad absurdum in future posts.


10/28/11 - Update.  In my transcript of Daniel Dennett's presentation I couldn't make out the name of one Alexander Vilenkin, a well known Russian-American cosmologist.  He's the "Alex" of whom Dennett refers.